To many, the poster child for David Marr's famous three levels of scientific inquiry is reinforcement learning -a computational theory of reward optimization, which readily prescribes algorithmic solutions that evidence striking resemblance to signals found in the brain, suggesting a straightforward neural implementation. Here we review questions that remain open at each level of analysis, concluding that the path forward to their resolution calls for inspiration across levels, rather than a focus on mutual constraints. Over the past 25 years, reinforcement learning (RL) has risen from relative obscurity to scientific stardom (Figure 1 ), now encompassing hundreds of researchers in disciplines as varied as economics, computer science, robotics, psychology, ethology, and neuroscience. Arguably this success can be attributed to the fact that, as a field, RL straddles all three levels of Marr's famous framework of scientific inquiry in computational neuroscience [1]. At the computational level, RL defines a small set of normative targets (accurately predicting the sum of future rewards, choosing actions that maximize reward attained, etc.). The algorithmic level -a host of solutions that achieve these normative goals -elegantly derives directly from the definition of the computational targets [2]. In particular, describing decision making problems in terms of Markov (memoryless) decision processes allows for recursive computation of both reward predictions and action values, using local prediction errors [3,4]. Finally, at the implementational level, these algorithms have been closely tied to neural substrates of learning and prediction in the basal ganglia [5][6][7][8], and in particular, prediction errors have been linked to dopaminergic signaling in the brain [9][10][11]. At the risk of drawing boundaries that are sometimes artificial, here we summarize at each of these levels recent findings and current open questions in the field of RL as it is studied in the fields of psychology and neuroscience. Marr's levels, as an organizing principle, serve to highlight conceptual differences between questions asked at each level, and how findings at one level can inspire progress in another.
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The computational level: the goals of a decision-making system
At the computational level, the basic goal of an agent or a decision-making system is to maximize reward and minimize punishment. Although one might argue whether this is the true goal of agents from an evolutionary perspective, different definitions of reward and punishment allow considerable flexibility. Indeed, work in recent years has elaborated on what constitutes a reward -in addition to the obvious food and shelter (and their associated conditioned reinforcers) there seem to be other forms of reward that are perhaps similarly primary in nature [12] . For instance, 'curiosity' can be seen as motivated by the goal of seeking information [13, 14] , and work on intrinsic motivation [15] has suggested that agents may maximize not only the sum of future rewards, but also the reduction of uncertainty about rewards in the environment [16] [17] [18] . Moreover, behavioral results, and corresponding neural recordings in monkeys, have convincingly shown that advance information is valuable in of itself, that is, even if this information cannot be acted upon [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] .
A related line of work has asked what fictitious, internal rewards an animal (or experimenter) could design, that would assist in ultimately achieving highest fitness in the environment. In this framework of 'shaping rewards' the computational-level question is: what is the optimal (pseudo-)reward function with which learning with a specific (possibly limited) set of algorithms would end up maximizing real reward or evolutionary fitness? Recent findings have highlighted that separating the evaluative role of reward functions from their policy-shaping role is beneficial for agents that are bounded (e.g., in terms of the accuracy of their representation of the environment, their capacity for planning, or the learning algorithms they are restricted to use). That is, for different statistics of environments and structure of agents, there exist internal reward functions that lead to faster learning and higher asymptotic behavior, and these are different from the objective reward function [24, 25] . By reinforcing behaviors such as exploration or information seeking that are only indirectly related to objective fitness these internal reward functions mitigate the boundedness of the agent [26] , although one might argue that this is due to the reward function providing the agent with information 
